Understanding Terror Networks by Sageman Marc

Author:Sageman, Marc [Sageman, Marc]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780812206791
Publisher: University of Pennsylvania Press
Published: 2011-09-21T00:00:00+00:00

Social Affiliation

Friendship

A striking element in both of these accounts is the absence of both top-down recruitment and brainwashing of the plotters, concepts which have been the mainstay of conventional explanations of al Qaeda terrorism. In the millennial plot, three of the main plotters had not attended training camps in Afghanistan and were not even formally affiliated with al Qaeda. (Two were scheduled to go after the plot.) Nor were they particularly religious. Meskini drank beer, loved movies, and dated women he met in dance clubs. The Hamburg plotters were far more devout in their beliefs and practices. A theme in both accounts is the formation of a network of friendships that solidified and preceded formal induction into the terrorist organization. The size of the networks was similar, with eight members in each group: Ressam, Labsi, Atamani, Kamel, the Boumezbeur and Ikhlef brothers in Canada; Atta, bin al-Shibh, al-Shehhi, Jarrah, Motassadeq, Mzoudi, Essabar, and Bahaji in Hamburg. Some, such as the Boumezbeur and Ikhlef brothers (also Haouari and Meskini) in Canada and Mzoudi and Motassadeq in Hamburg, knew each other from the old country. They had grown up together and trusted each other. Around them were some peripheral members: Haouari and Hannachi in one case, and Belfas and Zammar in the other.

During an incubation period of almost two years, the intensity of their beliefs spiraled upward in an apparent game of oneupsmanship. This took place in what they hoped was the privacy of a refuge, but it was monitored by the police. The Canadian police label of “bunch of guys” is appropriate. Kay Nehm, the German federal prosecutor, commented, “All the members of this cell shared the same religious convictions, an Islamic lifestyle, a feeling of being out of place in unfamiliar cultural surroundings that they weren’t used to. At the center of this stood a hatred of world Jewry and the United States” (Williams, 2002). Nor were the friends particularly discreet about their views. Yazir Mukla, a Moroccan student who was occasionally part of the group, testified at Motassadeq’s trial that when his father came to visit him, he was so alarmed at the radical atmosphere at al-Quds Mosque that he forbade his son to have any further contact with the group. He eventually forced his son to return to Morocco in 1999 (Notz, Steinborn, and Williamson, 2003).

This escalation of rhetorical militancy and condemnation of the West within a group of close friends was also noted in Milan, where the Italian authorities had wiretapped the apartment of al Qaeda’s Varenese network and monitored their conversations for years. The Italian prosecutor Stefano Dambruoso speculated that their “chatter” about destroying the world was essential for keeping up their morale and egging each other on. “These are people with a lot of problems. Adapting to this country is devastating to them. In radical religious activity they found rules, a structure. It’s not just religious, it’s psychological and personal. The talk helps them stay fanaticized, to maintain their mind and never relent” (Rotella, 2002b).

At some point, the friends were ready to join the global Salafi jihad.

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